

AGOS aktuell

Informationen der Arbeitsgruppe Ostseeraum



Nr. 10

Januar 2015

Sehr geehrte Leser,

wir möchten Ihnen zunächst alles Gute, Gesundheit und Erfolg für 2015 wünschen!

Das neue Jahr nutzen wir für den Rückblick auf eine interessante Reise der Arbeitsgruppe Ostseeraum nach Finnland.

Der Hauptartikel ist dem zweiten Teil unserer Serie zu Sicherheitspolitik im Ostseeraum gewidmet. Tim-Åke Pentz liefert hierzu eine Darstellung zur *hard security* in der Region, die durch den Ukraine-Russland-Konflikt eine neue Bedeutung erlangt hat.

Im Besprechungsteil steht eine etwas andere Landeskunde zu Mecklenburg-Vorpommern von Christopher Dietrich im Mittelpunkt.

In der Serie „Who is who“ wird diesmal der Generalsekretär der Union of Baltic Cities (UBC), Paweł Żaboklicki vorgestellt.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen aus Rostock

Prof. Dr. Nikolaus Werz

Leiter der Arbeitsgruppe Ostseeraum

Inhalt

Neues aus der AGOS	2
Baltic Sea Region Security in the 21 st Century <i>Tim-Åke Pentz, Universität Rostock</i>	3
»gesehen, gehört, gelesen« Zwischen Landeskunde und Kabarett	12
News & Termine	13
Who is who: Paweł Żaboklicki	14

AGOS Zahlenwerk

~ 87,8 zu 73,5

Milliarden US\$ betragen die russischen Militärausgaben des Jahres 2013 im Vergleich zu dem gleichen Haushaltsposten aller anderen Ostseeanrainer zusammen. (Quelle: SIPRI 2013)



Autor: NormanEinstein.

Neues aus der AGOS

Reisebericht – Die AGOS in Finnland

Das Wissenschaftskulturen an Grenzen gebunden sind, ist angesichts der Entstehung von Nationalstaaten im 19. Jahrhundert wenig überraschend. Durch die freundliche Förderung des Akademischen Auslandsamtes der Universität Rostock (DAAD Dozentenmobilität) wurde eine solche persönliche Empirie in Form der Reise der Arbeitsgruppe Ostseeraum (AGOS) nach Finnland ermöglicht. Professor Nikolaus Werz (Lehrstuhlinhaber Vergleichende Regierungslehre am Institut für Politik- und Verwaltungswissenschaftler der Universität Rostock) und Christian Nestler (wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter an diesem Lehrstuhl) flogen am 23. September 2014 von Berlin nach Helsinki. Neben der Hauptstadt des Landes und Turku war vor allem die im Südwesten gelegene – ehemalige – Industriestadt Pori Ziel.

Anliegen war neben einem allgemeinen Wissensaustausch die Vertiefung der Kooperation mit den finnischen Partnern. Diese hatten im Juni 2013 Rostock besucht und dort den Gegenpart eines binationalen Doktoranden-Forums gebildet (AGOS aktuell Nr. 5).

Die Reise erwies sich sogleich als Bewegung über eine Jahreszeitengrenze hinweg. Nach spätsommerlichen 15 Grad in Deutschland hatte es jenseits des Finnischen Meerbusens gerade noch vier Grad mit Wind und Niederschlag. In diesem Sinne war der erste Erkenntnisgewinn der Reise, dass es nie schadet eine dicke Jacke und eine Mütze nach Finnland mitzunehmen.

Die Fahrt vom Flughafen nach Pori dauerte rund vier Stunden. Der Bus, der in Finnland eine gut organisierte und pünktliche Alternative zur Bahn ist, war warm und bot Gelegenheit, für die Lektüre der sehr lesenswerten „Gebrauchsanweisung für Finnland“ von Ro-



Blick die Altstadt von Rauma (© Christian Nestler).



Der Seminarraum auf der Insel Repposari (© Christian Nestler).



Das Universitätszentrum in Pori (© Christian Nestler).

man Schatz.¹ Der Blick aus dem Fenster bestätigte die dargebotene Landschaftsbeschreibung: Bäume und Granit.

Am Abend empfing uns die einladende Professorin für Cultural Heritage Studies Outi Tuomi-Nikula zu einem diskursiven Ausklang des Reisetages.

Am zweiten Tag machten wir uns zusammen mit Professorin Outi den Weg von Pori nach Turku. Die Stadt

¹ Roman Schatz, Gebrauchsanweisung für Finnland. München 2010.

und in gleichem Maße die Universität sind ausgesprochen Sehenswert. Das Institut für Politikwissenschaft und Zeitgeschichte ist zum Teil in ehemaligen Militärbaracken aus der russischen Kolonialzeit untergebracht. Gegenwärtig befinden sich hier Seminarräume und Büros, in dieser Hinsicht eine Gemeinsamkeit zu Rostock. In der Hansestadt hat bekannter Maßen die Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät eine ehemalige Militärkaserne – zur DDR-Zeit Standort der russischen Truppen – bezogen. Das Institut in Turku besteht aus insgesamt sechs Professoren und dem Direktor des John Morton Center.²

In Turku trafen wir mit unseren Reisepartnern von der Herbert Quandt-Stiftung zusammen. Dr. Christof Eichert den CEO und Roland Löffler³ den Berliner Büroleiter der Stiftung. Nach einem gemeinsamen Mittag begaben wir uns den halben Weg zurück nach Pori in die Weltkulturerbestadt Rauma. Hier gibt es eine historische Häusersiedlung die, zwar größtenteils privat bewohnt ist, aber immer noch nach den traditionellen Plänen in Stand gehalten wird.

Auf der Insel Repposari, an der finnischen Westküste, war der dritte Tag dem Seminar „Cultural and Political Discussions on the Baltic Sea Region“ gewidmet. Die Beiträge haben in Heft 9, S. 7-8 Eingang gefunden. Insgesamt war die thematische Breite bemerkenswert, in der Betrachtung von kulturellen aber auch politischen Fragestellungen ist die finnische Wissenschaftskultur in vielerlei Hinsicht deutlich pragmatischer als die deutsche. Konkret fiel auf, dass gerade die jungen Wissenschaftsprojekte häufig sehr nah am Untersuchungsobjekt sind. Der Zugang über die europäische Ethnologie bietet in Verbindung mit der Politikwissenschaft eine methodische Vielfalt, welche die Kooperation ausgesprochen belebt.

Bei unserer Rückfahrt bekamen wir dann noch die Gelegenheit das 2001 gegründete Universitätszentrum in Pori selbst zu besichtigen. Dies befindet sich in einer alten Textilfabrik, was architektonisch von außen aber auch von innen noch gut erkennbar ist.

Vor der Rückreise nach Deutschland hatten wir einen Tag in Helsinki. Wir nutzten die Chance und besuchten unter anderem die Felsenkirche, den Bahnhof, den Südhafen und sahen das Olympiastadion. Der Pragmatismus der Finnen zeigte sich wiederum in ihrer Architektur. Diese variierte zum Teil zwischen Stilen und Epochen von Haus zu Haus. Wenn also zu einem Zeitpunkt ein Haus leergezogen bzw. verfallen war, hat man sich nicht die Mühe gemacht dieses wie seine Nachbarn zu rekonstruieren, sondern hat einfach nach den aktuellen Gegebenheiten gebaut. (cn)

² Weitere Informationen über die Faculty of Social Sciences finden Sie unter: www.utu.fi/en/units (Stand: 10.12.2014).

³ Herr Löffler hat Anfang der 1990er Jahre einen Beitrag zur touristischen Erschließung Finnlands für Reisende geleistet: Thomas Barow/Roland Löffler (Mitar.), Finnland per Rad, Neuenhagen 1994.

A Flashpoint again? Baltic Sea Region Security in the 21st Century

Tim-Åke Pentz

Some monsters are hard to be slain. Looming around the waters of the Baltic Sea, biting it's time a behemoth called "hard security" has re-emerged in the wake of the Russian-Ukraine hybrid war threatening the peaceful and mostly picturesque shores of the Baltic Sea states. As a follow up on Nikolaus Werz' article about the Cold War and Transformation processes in the Baltic Sea Region¹ this article is the second part of the AGOS series about Baltic Sea Region Security. It scrutinizes recent security developments in the Baltic Sea Region and tries to answer the question if the North is once again on its way to become an international relations security flashpoint for the years to come.

1. The return of a behemoth called „hard security“

With the end of the Cold War the Baltic Sea Region (BSR) has been promoted as a blueprint for the peaceful and democratic transformation of a region benumbed by Soviet totalitarianism and the stalemate of the two blocs in the 20th century.² "Soft security" appeared on the agenda and was one of the most used buzz words in the previous decades describing a visionary state of mind where mutual understanding and co-operation should lead, as Knudsen put it, from a "zone of confrontation into one of potential integration".³ A glance at the scenery today shows that the BSR has indeed gone through remarkable economical and political changes since 1989/1990. It belongs to the most vibrant, wealthy and innovative regions in Europe and in the world.⁴ In an overall assessment the live standard of its population increased substantial and hard military security debates were gradually substituted at multi- and bi-national level with "soft security" issues like environmental protection (e.g. HELCOM), civil society exchange (e.g. German-Russian Petersburg Dialogue) or the joint fight against organised crime (e.g. CBSS Task Force on Organised Crime in the Baltic Sea Region).⁵ However, this at least at the surface almost picture perfect success story of the BSR suffers remarkably in the light of the Russian-Ukraine conflict. Geopolitical and hard security debates are re-emerging on a daily basis in the Baltic Sea Region.⁶ For the first time in 22 years the annual CBSS Ministerial Meeting was cancelled⁷ and the Petersburger Dialogue 2014 has been suspended.⁸ Against this backdrop this article tries to answer the question whether the Baltic Sea Region is once more on it's fatal way to become an international relations security flashpoint or does the tale of the exceptional peaceful transformation of the Baltic Sea Region only need some minor revisions?

2. What is a security flashpoint?

A security flashpoint can be generally defined as a "current, dormant or potential area of geopolitical instability".⁹ However, a geographical area can't be a flashpoint by itself. Thus it would be better to understand a flashpoint as *space defined by the interaction of two or more adversaries in a given geographical location*. In addition three important characteristics may further help to define the nature of a flashpoint.¹⁰ (1) *Longue*

durée: The existence of unsolved and recurrent disputes between two or more adversaries in a given geographical location, which may have historical, cultural/religious, economic, geographical, political/ideological and/or psychological roots. (2) *Fragility*: Relationships between the adversaries (both on political level and between civil societies) are unstable and tend to quickly deteriorate in the light of sensitive or unforeseen events. (3) *Escalation potential*: Involvement of additional and more powerful actors is likely, raising the possibility of escalation of a conflict.

3. Stock take: Security stressors in the Baltic Sea Region

With the concept of a security flashpoint in mind this section scrutinizes *security stressors*¹¹ in the region to underline the argument, that the BSR might become again a security flashpoint due to a) *a growing military imbalance*, b) *sensitive geography*, c) *unresolved cultural and historical disputes*, d) *psychological aspects* and e) *economic dependencies*. Some of these developments or political issues are in fact disputes, which are pending to be solved for quite some time. The question of Kaliningrad, a strategically important Russian exclave, or the issue of Russian speaking "minorities" in the Baltic States are just two examples.¹² In the light of the Russian annexation of Crimea these kinds of stressors seem to mash up into a quite dangerous compound. It will be noticed that most security issues are illustrated referring to the traditionally poor relationship between Russia and the Baltic States, which represents the weakest link in the BSR security environment. Both Russia and the Baltic States are key players in the BSR: Russia as increasingly militarized regional hegemon and the Baltic States as so called "canary in the mine"¹³ to warn NATO and EU of possible threats.

a) Military aspects

This article focuses on three military aspects indicating a deterioration of interstate relations in the BSR: The *growing military imbalance*, the *increasing number of incidents involving Russian and Western military* and the *changed objectives of recent military exercises in the region*.

Tab. 1: Military expenditures by Baltic Sea Region country as percentage of the gross domestic product (figures in red are SIPRI estimates)

Country	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Russia	3,9	3,5	3,6	3,5	3,4	3,3	4,1	3,8	3,7	3,9	4,1
Germany	1,4	1,4	1,4	1,3	1,3	1,3	1,4	1,4	1,3	1,4	1,4
Sweden	1,7	1,5	1,4	1,4	1,4	1,2	1,2	1,3	1,2	1,2	1,2
Finland	1,4	1,4	1,4	1,4	1,2	1,3	1,5	1,4	1,4	1,2	1,2
Denmark	1,5	1,5	1,3	1,4	1,3	1,4	1,4	1,4	1,4	1,4	1,4
Poland	1,9	1,9	1,9	1,9	2,0	1,8	1,8	1,9	1,8	1,8	1,8
Estonia	1,7	1,7	1,9	1,9	2,1	2,1	2,3	1,8	1,7	2,0	2,0
Lithuania	1,1	1,2	1,2	1,2	1,1	1,1	1,1	0,9	0,8	0,8	0,8
Latvia	1,7	1,7	1,7	1,9	1,7	1,7	1,4	1,1	1,0	0,9	1,0

Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Data Base, www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database, last access: 20.9.2014.

- Military imbalance:** After the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Warsaw Pact, the regions governments no longer perceived a direct military conflict between the two blocs as an imminent threat to their territorial integrity. A general cut back of military expenditures (see Tab. 1), the downsizing of the number of troops and the suspension of Compulsory Military Service (see Tab. 2) in most of the BSR states can be seen as indicators for this new perception. Russia however is an exception to this trend. In relation to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) she spends three times more on military equipment, development and personal (4,1 % of GDP) as the other BSR states with an average of 1,35 % of their GDP. In real monetary terms (see Tab. 3) Russia's annual military expenditures have quintupled in 2003-2013. As a result of Russia's military reforms heavy divisions were replaced with lighter and more flexible units. For the region this is of special importance since the reorganisation of Russian military districts means that approximately 60 Brigades would stand in permanent readiness. According to Järvenpää Russian high-readiness forces would be deployable in 6-8 hours, enabling Russia to carry out fast co-ordinated military operations in the region at any given time.¹⁴
- Recent incidents involving Russian and Western Military:** Frear, Kulesa and Kearns assessed almost 40 recent incidents such as violations of national airspace, emergency scrambles, narrowly avoided mid-air collisions, close encounters at sea.¹⁵ The majority of these recent incidents took place in the Baltic Sea Region involving Russian forces outside its own national territory.¹⁶
- Changed objectives of Military Exercises in the BSR:** Military exercises are usual activities of BSR military forces but with the outbreak of the conflict in the Ukraine both Russia and western forces have stepped up military manoeuvres rapidly. Assessing these manoeuvres it seems that also their objectives have changed to an invasion/defence-mode between Russia and other BSR states. The Russian-Belarusian ZAPAD-13 (West-13) manoeuvre in autumn 2013 as one case in point was announced as anti-terrorism exercise in the Russian Western Military District with 10.000 troops officially participating.¹⁷ According to the Lithuanian government¹⁸ and military experts¹⁹ the real number of troops involved could be considerably higher (up to approximately 70.000 personnel). Also the kind of troops involved, including the mobile Iskander Ballistic Missiles (SS 26-Stone) live firings, amphibious landings, rapid reaction force operations, airborne operations and the geographical scope of the manoeuvre do not seem to correspond with the announced anti-terrorism exercise²⁰ but reveal more the objective to train an invasion of territory along Russia's western borders. On the other hand the NATO led manoeuvre STEADFAST JAZZ 2013 held in Poland and the Baltic states has been not only the largest exercise in six years but also envisaged the application of Article V of the Washington Treaty for the first time since 1993 as theoretical background. Officially the purpose of the exercise was „(...) to make sure that NATO's new rapid-reaction force, the NATO Response Force, is ready to defend any ally, deploy anywhere and deal with any threat.”²¹ For most experts and commentators however in-officially the scenario at hand was a simulated Russian attack on Poland or the Baltic States territory. Both examples seem to speak for the return of threat-defence sequences known from the Cold-War period.

Tab. 2: Compulsory Military Service (CMS) in the BSR

Country	CMS (suspension of service)	Duration CMS
Russia	Yes	12 months
Germany	No (2011)	
Sweden	No (2010)	
Finland	Yes	6-12 months
Denmark	No (no general conscription/drawing of lots)	4 months
Poland	No (2010)	
Estonia	Yes	8 months
Lithuania	No (2009)	
Latvia	No (2007)	

Source: Center for Security Studies (CSS) Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich, www.css.ethz.ch/policy_consultancy/dossiers_CH/Wehrpflicht_und_Milizsystem/Wehrpflicht_oder_Freiwilligenarmee, last access: 24.11.2014.

Tab. 3: Military expenditure by Baltic Sea Region country, in current US\$ m.

Country	2003	2013
Russia	16.974	87.837
Germany	35.055	48.790
Sweden	5.306	6.519
Finland	2.264	3.262
Denmark	3.199	4.552
Poland	4.150	9.257
Estonia	171	479
Lithuania	211	355
Latvia	189	299

Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Data Base. www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database, last access: 20.9.2014.

b) Geographical aspects

Throughout history the BSR has been both a zone of restless frontiers, changing regional super powers and coalitions. After the re-unification of Germany 1990, and the independence of Poland, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia the geopolitical landscape of the region changed tremendously. The Baltic Sea turned from a „no-man’s land“²² or even from a „Mare Sovieticum“²³ to an „European Sea“.²⁴ For Russia the former “hegemon of the Baltic region”²⁵ this shift has been dramatic – not only psychologically but also geographically.



Even though most of the border issues in the BSR have been settled and the inviolability of borders is constantly re-assured, fear of territorial disputes has re-emerged in the BSR in the wake of the Russian-Ukraine conflict.²⁶ This section focuses on three security relevant geographical issues: *the Kaliningrad Oblast exclave, the border treaty between Russia and Estonia* and *the legacy of the Soviet population policy in the Baltic States*.

- *Kaliningrad Oblast exclave:* The breakup of the SU deprived the Russian Baltic Fleet of key bases in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, leaving Kaliningrad Oblast as the fleets only outlet to the Baltic Sea. With the declaration of independence of Poland and Lithuania the Kaliningrad Oblast became a Russian exclave - geographically included in the European Union while remaining under Russian sovereignty. Kaliningrad being heavily militarized during the Cold War is still Russia’s strongest foothold in Europe. The discussion about Kaliningrad’s de-militarization as a Sisyphean task has troubled it’s neighbours ever since.²⁷ On the other side, Kaliningrad as one of Russia’s Special Economic Zones (in-officially branded as Russian Monaco or Russian Hong Kong) and as showcase of EU-Russian co-operation the Oblast also experienced some time of economic growth which seems to be jeopardized following the Russian-Ukraine conflict.
- *Border treaty between Russia and Estonia:* Another geographical case illustrating the geographical sensitivity in the BSR is the border treaty process between Estonia and Russia. After almost 20 years of negotiations the treaty has finally been signed in 2014 but cannot enter into force. Since the outbreak of the Russian-Ukraine conflict the ratification processes in both national parliaments have been frozen.²⁸
- *Soviet population policy legacy:* Estonia and Latvia and to a lesser extend Lithuania still have to cope with the Soviets population policy legacy. Under Stalin’s rule Soviet population policy included the deportation of Estonians, Lithuanians and Latvians and the transfer of Russians to the Baltic States especially to the border regions and capitals. Altogether 15% of the population of the Baltic States was arrested, deported, and/or executed. Alone in Lithuania 130.000 persons were deported of which 28.000 died in Siberia.²⁹ After the downfall of the SU ethnic Russians suddenly found themselves living in democratic and sovereign countries, which tried to minimize the Russian influence in day-to-day living and state policy. Currently there are 556.422 (26,9% of total population)³⁰ ethnic Russians living in Latvia, 332.816 (25,3% of the total population) in Estonia and 176.913 (5,8% of the total population) in Lithuania. Considering that for example the most north-eastern part of Estonia, the Ida-Viru county, is inhabited by 72,8% ethnic Russians³¹, there is a growing fear among ethnical Estonians that Russia’s interference in the Ukraine could be a blue print also for the Baltic States.

c) Cultural and historical aspects:

Myths, historical narratives and traditions constitute group beliefs and collective identities, which are said to influence interstate relations.³² If these collective identities between different governments or societies are too divergent sustainable trust building and co-operation is almost impossible. This assumption seems to be valid for the BSR. For the stock take two issues are highlighted: the issue of *diverging historical narratives*, and the issue of *diverging security identities* in the BSR.

- *Diverging historical narratives*: An especially weak link in the BSR security environment is the relationship between Russia and the former Soviet Republics Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Their relationship is traditionally defined by mistrust and fear against Russia, which is accused as former occupant of using both military threat and soft power politics (public relations, state funding of Russia friendly NGO and political parties) to regain control over the Baltic States after their independence.³³ Russia on the other side accuses the Baltic States for mistreating the Russian speaking minorities and to discredit the fact that the Soviet Union freed the Baltic States from fascist rule. These different approaches to the history of Soviet rule in the Baltic States hamper reconciliation and have the potential to lead to events, which could be used as rationale for a Russian intervention in the Baltic States. One prominent example in this regard was the relocation of a Soviet era monument – the Bronze Soldier – in 2007 from downtown Tallinn to a military cemetery, which led to massive riots of Russian speaking youth in Estonia and which finally escalated in the siege of the Estonian embassy in Moscow. An escalation which is even more remarkable knowing that only few months before a Great Patriotic War Monument was demolished (not relocated) in Khimki, a Moscow suburb, to make room for redevelopment.³⁴ The tendency in Russia to declare a certain historical narrative as “sacred” and only truth chokes off any chance of historical debate and with it the chance of reconciliation. This trend can be exemplified by a statement of Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov with regard to the Soviet legacy: “the memory of the victors does not fade, this memory is sacred to us, and attempts to relate to this memory blasphemously, to commit outrages against it, to rewrite history, cannot fail to anger us.”³⁵
- *Diverging security identities*: In the BSR basically two security identities exist which are not compatible. Russia according to Mölder seems to be cemented in a “Hobbesian” mode of understanding international relations marked by power, threat, spheres of influence and competition while other BSR member states have changed their security identities to a “post-modern” European mode in a more “Kantian” sense of cooperation, integration and trust.³⁶ There basically seemed to be no “enemy other” left to fear. Or as Weaver put it in 1996: “(...) Europe’s Other is Europe’s own past which should not be allowed to become its future”³⁷

Russia on the contrary has returned to see NATO and its members as the enemy Other as main threat to her territory which resembles the Soviet discourse about NATO as “aggressivnyi blok”. Another insight stems from Zevelev who links the domestic identity discourse in Russia with the recent developments in Russia’s security and foreign policy. According to Zevelev Russia’s decisions concerning the involvement in Ukraine were prompted by a specific worldview and a shift in Russian foreign policy thought with the concepts of “a divided people,” “protecting compatriots abroad,” “the Russian world”, and the belief in “the Great Russian Civilization” at its centre.³⁸ Thus involvement in all states with a Russian minority becomes almost mandatory for the Russian government irrespective if the territorial gain is strategically worth the effort.

d) Psychological aspects:

Political relations in the BSR are charged with emotions such as fear, shame or bitterness. These psychological aspects are key elements of political decision-making and can be powerful assets in policy analysis. It is of course debatable if psychological diagnostic patterns can or should be used for policy analysis. However, if used carefully these interdisciplinary approaches may lead to new insights for analysis and problem solving. For the stock take of security stressors two emotional concepts seem to be most prominent in the BSR security discourse: *fear* and *embitterment*.

- *Fear*: In the BSR fear plays mainly in the relationship between Russia and the Baltic States³⁹ as well as between Russia and Finland a crucial role. If understood as social process (collective) fear is the most corrosive force in politics. It has the potential to lead to misperceptions about the purposes of other players in a security environment by taking the worst-case scenario as most plausible scenario at hand. This in turn may lead to the internalisation of a constantly defensive and distrustful attitude (fear conditioning).⁴⁰ Fear may thus become a destabilizing factor in interstate relationships whether the respective threat perception is actually justified or not.
- *Embitterment*: In 2003 German psychiatrist Michael Linden introduced a pathological reaction to adverse life events called Posttraumatic Embitterment Disorder (PTED). Especially patients from the former “German Democratic Republic” showed experiences of subjective injustice and violation of basic beliefs following the German re-unification leading to deep embitterment. The symptoms of PTED can be very severe, chronic, life threatening (because of suicidal and/or homicidal fantasies), and hard to treat, and often result in disability in almost all areas of life.⁴¹ Patients with this disorder are almost treatment resistant because they express the feeling that the ‘world around has to change and not themselves’. Moreover, sufferers tend to have a desire for vengeance and revenge.⁴² As Larrabee describes it the

Tab. 4: Excerpts from recent addresses of President Vladimir Putin

Address by President of the Russian Federation 18 March 2014, 15:50, The Kremlin, Moscow	“Unfortunately, what seemed impossible became a reality. The USSR fell apart.”
	“Millions of people went to bed in one country and awoke in different ones, overnight becoming ethnic minorities in former Union republics, while the Russian nation became one of the biggest, if not the biggest ethnic group in the world to be divided by borders.”
	Are we ready to consistently defend our national interests, or will we forever give in, retreat to who knows where?
Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly 4 December 2014, 13:20, The Kremlin, Moscow	If for some European countries national pride is a long-forgotten concept and sovereignty is too much of a luxury, true sovereignty for Russia is absolutely necessary for survival.
	I would like to emphasise this: either we remain a sovereign nation, or we dissolve without a trace and lose our identity.
	No one will ever attain military superiority over Russia. We have a modern and combat ready army.

Source: Address by President of the Russian Federation 18 March 2014, 15:50, The Kremlin, Moscow, <http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6889>, last access 9.12.2014 and Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly 4 December 2014, 13:20, The Kremlin, Moscow, <http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/23341>, last access 9.12.2014.

collapse of the Soviet Union was a “traumatic shock” leaving Russia “weak and frustrated”. “Accustomed to being a superpower - and being treated as one - Russian leaders found it difficult to accept that Russia’s influence in world affairs had sharply declined and that the country’s voice in foreign policy no longer counted for much.”⁴³ The recent addresses of President Putin may be interpreted as a vocalisation of a certain form of embitterment, subjective experienced injustice against Russia and the wish to restore national pride and military power (see Tab. 4).

e) Economic aspects

There are at least two economic challenges, which could be seen as stressors for the BSR security environment: the *lack of structural reforms in Russia* and the *energy supply interdependence* between Russia and other BSR states.

- *Lack of structural reforms in Russia:* Considering Russia’s almost-bankruptcy in 1998 her economy has developed positively at the surface. A substantial currency reserve build-up (471,6 billion Dollar, April 2014)⁴⁴ and increasing average wages underline this trend.⁴⁵ According to Inosemzew however this development is based mainly on two pillars: the export of gas and oil and a redistribution of financial resources away from infrastructure and industrial development to individual consumption. Thus Russia seems to have become a consumer society without production capabilities. Financial institutes back up this analysis: “Russia’s growth model is built on commodities, especially oil, and this served well while prices were rising (in US dollars, its economy has grown nearly tenfold since the post-crisis low of 1999). Alas, the side-effect of this was an ever-increasing dependence on those sectors, suppression of other sectors, and corruption.”⁴⁶ In combination with the Russian-Ukraine conflict stagnation or even recession of Russia’s economy seems likely which could turn into a source of political instability in Russia and thus in the BSR.

- *Energy supply (inter-)dependence:* There is no other sector with a comparable high rate of interaction between Russia and Europe as the energy sector. Russia belongs to the world’s largest energy exporting nations and is thus a major global energy player. For the BSR states energy security questions have constantly been an issue of stress and emotional debates with regard to natural gas transit, price regulation or more recently concerning the development of the North Stream pipelines across the Baltic Sea connecting Germany and Russia. While some commentators stress the growing Russian influence on domestic energy markets, which could be used by Russian officials to influence foreign and domestic policies of the BSR states, other analysts do not see why Russia should wield this “Energiewaffe”.⁴⁷ Referring to historical experiences it is pointed out that even during Cold War times Russia has been a reliable energy supplier (“hard cash for red gas”) and that she would destabilise her own national economy which is so heavily depending on the export of natural gas and crude oil. This assessments however falls somewhat short in not addressing the trend of Russian partly state controlled energy companies gaining economical influence in other countries energy infrastructure and domestic companies.⁴⁸ This trend could lead to a situation where Russian companies and government officials have at least a big say across the full energy value chain from production, transfer, storage, retailing and price policy.

4. Analysis: A powder keg of unsolved problems

Several shortcomings of the previous stock take have to be addressed: First, the stock take of security relevant issues is far from being exhaustive. Secondly, due to the broad range of illustrated issues each aspect could only be touched shortly and not to the extent of an in-depth analysis. Thirdly, the single aspects leave considerable leeway for interpretation.

The motivation behind this approach to BSR security in the 21st century was to introduce a broader view on

the diversity of issues relevant to security assuming that different security challenges tend to mix up into a dangerous compound, which only needs a certain trigger to transform a former region of co-operation and integration into a security flashpoint.

As stated each of the addressed challenges in this article is subject to interpretation. The growing military imbalance for example could be interpreted as normal re-gathering of military strength in relation to Russia's geographical size and historical legacy after a time of weakness. Also the modernization of the armed forces is actually more a global trend and nothing specifically Russian. The same information could on the other side also be interpreted as direct threat to the territorial integrity of Poland, Finland, the Baltic States and their allies.

Regarding the geography of the BSR it is evident that it consists of a very diverse setting of states in size, population, economic or military power. This in itself does not necessarily lead to interstate mistrust or conflicts per se. Also the sandwich situation of Kaliningrad is naturally more a logistical and organisational challenge, which could be dealt with outside any security debate. On the other hand the Kaliningrad situation or suddenly emerging separatist tendencies in the Russian speaking parts of the Baltic States could be used as bargaining chips by the Russian government or even as a rationale of direct or indirect interference in the Baltic States.

The challenges of cultural and historical differences in the BSR give less leeway for interpretation. It is evident that especially the Baltic States and Russia followed and are still following different paths of nation building narratives. While the Baltic States have embraced quickly the narrative and historical legacy referring to a Baltic Sea Region and European identity which was only hindered by Soviet occupation, Russia tends to see her legacy in the increasingly "sacralised" history of the Soviet and Zartist empires which does not allow different interpretations of Russian history and thus inflicts the chance for debate and reconciliation in the Baltic Rim.

Closely related to cultural and historical challenges in the BSR is the assumption that there exists something like a collective psychological matrix in interstate relations based on historical experiences and adverse life events. While one could say that the BSR in the last 20 years was more profoundly known for concepts like *trust* and an *even temper* this article argues that *fear* (Baltic States) and even more *embitterment* (Russia) playing a key role in understanding the BSR security environment.

Also the addressed economical challenges in the BSR - the *lack of structural reforms in Russia* and the *energy supply interdependence* - leave room for interpretation. While some economic consultants with close ties to the Russian government speak of a flourishing economy the majority



During the Crimean War 1853-1856 the Baltic Sea became a theater of war too. William Simpson's painting shows the bombardment of Russian Bomarsund fortress on Åland Islands by combined British and French navy forces (Source: wikimedia commons).

of analysts see Russia in economic terms as apparent giant with feet of clay. Closely related to this is the energy supply dependence between Russia and the other BSR states. Irrespective of the true underlying motives of Russian energy policy towards Europe and the BSR the wish to become less dependent on Russian oil and gas has led BSR state governments to improve resource efficiency and to look for alternative energy sources which in turn could have negative impacts on Russian state revenues. A Russian stagnating economy or even a recession would add to a grim picture of the future of the BSR and would pose an imminent threat to the political stability in the region.

5. Conclusion: Flashpoint Baltic Sea Region - The "normalization" of security relations?

This article has pointed out several security stressors that underline the assumption that the BSR once more is on its fatal way to become a security flashpoint in the 21st Century. This assumption seems to be valid assessing the defining elements of a flashpoint:

- Existence of unsolved and recurrent disputes e.g. Russian minorities in the Baltic States, energy supply (inter-)dependence, (de-) militarization of Kaliningrad (*Longue durée*).
- Easily deterioration of disputes within a BSR state and between BSR states e.g. the relocation of the Bronze Soldier, Siege of Estonian embassy in Moscow, defending Russian "compatriots abroad" (*Fragility*)
- Local and regional events dragging bigger powers into the conflict e.g. NATO and Russia (*Escalation potential*).

What does this development mean for the BSR security in the 21st century? It seems clear that after Russia's "spectacular geopolitical retreat"⁴⁹ following the downfall of the SU she is back in the game - even though not as hoped for. It is obvious that all attempts to include Russia in a post-modern security environment have failed so far. Instead there is an ongoing competition for integration (Integrationskonkurrenz) between the EU and Russia's "Greater Russian Civilization". The proclaimed "Greatness" however, does not seem to have the desired effect on former Soviet republics and states on Russia's "sphere of interest". As Graham notices: "(...) Russia is now totally surrounded (beyond the former Soviet space) by countries and regions that are more dynamic - politically, economically or demographically - than it is."⁵⁰ This situation is not very reassuring for Russia's government and calls for other measures to exert influence on Russia's "near abroad".

In this situation there are several research questions, which should be addressed on short notice:

- Does the concept of a "Greater Russian Civilization" imply territorial claims in the BSR?
- Is there a need for a regional counter weight outside

NATO to contain potential Russian claims to sovereign territories?

- How could a peacefully modus Vivendi look like between the EU and Russia based on the concept of a "Greater Russian Civilization"?
- Which role should Germany take in the BSR and what do other states in the region expect from Germany?
- Which modes of co-operation, conflict and conflict solving show other maritime regions in comparison with the BSR (Mediterranean Sea, Black Sea, South China Sea)?

As severe as the security situation may look like today in the BSR a stable and flourishing Russia is of utmost importance for the region as a whole. At the same time the territorial integrity and stability of all other states is not less important for a peaceful co-existence. As Hultdt correctly predicted in 1999 it will be "(...) here, in the North, fateful encounters will supposedly take place that will decide what Russia's future role in Europe will be - as partner or as outsider, potentially also as enemy."⁵¹

Anmerkungen

1 Nikolaus Werz (2014): Wasser verbindet, Land trennt - Kalter Krieg und Transformation im Ostseeraum. AGOS Aktuell 8/2014, pp. 3-7.

2 Cf. Bo Hultdt (1999): Security in the Baltic Sea Region. Jahrbuch für internationale Sicherheitspolitik 1999, E.S. Mittler und Sohn, p. 161.

3 Olav F. Knudsen (1999): A General Perspective on the Security of the Baltic Sea Region. In: Olav F. Knudsen (1999): Stability and Security in the Baltic Sea Region. p. 7.

4 Maria Holfve et al (2013): Turning Adversity into Opportunity - A Business Plan for the Baltic Sea. Boston Consulting Group, p. 14.

5 The Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission (HELCOM) is an intergovernmental organisation joined by all Baltic Sea countries. The Petersburger Dialogue was introduced 2001 and is described by the organisers as forum for the dialogue between civil society stakeholders from Germany and Russia. The Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS) is an intergovernmental organisation joined by all Baltic Sea Region States dealing with a wide range of policy issues.

6 Cf. Magnus Christiansson (2012): The Military Balance in the Baltic Sea Region - Notes on a Defunct Concept. In: Enrico Fels, Jan Frederik Kremer, Katharina Kronenberg (Hrsg.): Power in the 21st Century. Springer: 2012, pp. 117-135.

7 Hans Brask (2014): Governance Crisis in the Baltic Sea Region Cooperation? www.bdforum.org/hans-brask-governance-crisis-baltic-sea-region-cooperation/, last access: 9.12.2014.

8 Helena Baers (2014): Der „Petersburger Dialog“ liegt auf Eis. www.dw.de/der-petersburger-dialog-liegt-auf-eis/a-18085434, last access: 9.12.2014.

9 Ewan W. Anderson (2013): Global Geopolitical Flashpoints - An Atlas of Conflict. Routledge: New York, p. 17.

10 Cf. Timothy Hoyt (2003): Politics, proximity and paranoia - the evolution of Kashmir as nuclear flashpoint. India Review No. 2/3, p. 118.

11 Security stressors are defined here as internal and external stimuli that may trigger stress responses like show of force or direct and indirect interventions in interstate relations.

12 See for example Heinz Timmermann regarding Kaliningrad's role for the EU-Russia partnership or Carsten Giersch' article about the security policy challenges in the Baltic Sea Region in Detlef Jahn, Nikolaus Werz (Hrsg.) Politische Systeme und Beziehungen im Ostseeraum, München: Olzog Verlag, 2002.

13 Heather A. Conley, Caroline Rohloff (2014): Challenges to the Nordic-Baltic Region after Crimea - As seen from Washington. In: Daniel S. Hamilton, Andras Simonyi, Debra L. Cagan: Advancing U.S.-Nordic-Baltic Security Cooperation. Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University. http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/publications/books/Advancing_U.S.-Nordic-Baltic_Security_Cooperation/Chapter_8_Conley_Rohloff.pdf

14 Pauli Järvenpää (2014): Zapad 2013 - A view from Helsinki. www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/Zapad_2013_View_From_Helsinki_-Full.

pdf, last access 4.12.2014.

15 One of the most recent and prominent examples of the violation of national maritime space in the BSR was a suspected Russian submarine which has been detected in Swedish territorial waters in October 2014. Cf. Peter Forslund (2014): Här är bevisen för ubåtskränkningen, 14.11.2014, www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/har-ar-bevisen-for-ubatskrankningen_4101943.svd, last access 5.1.2015.

16 Thomas Frear, Lukasz Kulesa, Ian Keanrs (2014): Dangerous Brinkmanship – Close Military Encounters Between Russia and the West in 2014. European Leadership Network Policy Brief, 2014/11.

17 Opening remarks of Vladimir Putin at the meeting on the preliminary results of the Zapad-2013 joint Russian-Belarusian exercises, 26.9.2013. <http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/6040>, last access: 3.12.2014.

18 Cf. Hannes Gamillscheg (2013): Feuchte Großmachtträume. www.fr-online.de/politik/russisches-herbstmanoever-feuchte-grossmachttraeume,1472596,24536042.html, last access: 3.12.2014.

19 Stefan Hedlund (2013): Manöver Zapad – Russland lässt die Muskeln spielen. www.worldreview.info/de/content/manoever-zapad-russland-laest-die-muskeln-spielen, last access 24.11.2014.

20 Pauli Järvenpää (2014): Zapad 2013 – A view from Helsinki. http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/Zapad_2013_View_From_Helsinki_-_Full.pdf, last access 4.12.2014.

21 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_104648.htm, last access: 4.12.2014.

22 Adrian Hyde-Price (2000): NATO and the Baltic Sea Region – Towards Regional Security Governance? NATO Research Fellowship Scheme Final Report, p. 2. <http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/98-00/hyde.pdf>, last access 4.12.2014

23 Cf. N.N. (1950): Die Ostsee ein sowjetische Binnenmeer – Moskau lässt die Küste von Petsamo bis Lübeck in einen Festungsgürtel verwandeln. Die Zeit Online, <http://www.zeit.de/1950/28/die-ostsee-ein-sowjetisches-Binnenmeer>, last access: 04.12.2014.

24 Cf. Eckart D. Stratenschulte (ed., 2011): Das Europäische Meer – Die Ostsee als Handlungsraum. Europa-Analysen Schriften der Europäischen Akademie Berlin, Band 1.

25 Bo Huldt (1999): Security in the Baltic Sea Region. Jahrbuch für internationale Sicherheitspolitik 1999, E.S. Mittler und Sohn, P. 3.

26 Marcus Lütticke (2014): „Baltic States are worried and alert.“ www.dw.de/baltic-states-are-worried-and-alert/a-17515615, last access: 10.12.2014. See also Monika Griebeler (2014): Lithuania's deep fear of Russia. www.dw.de/lithuanias-deep-fear-of-russia/a-17659404, last access 10.12.2014 or Matt Ford (2014): Russia's Seizure of Crimea is making former Soviet States nervous. <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/03/russias-seizure-of-crimea-is-making-former-soviet-states-nervous/284156>, last access: 10.12.2014.

27 cf. Matthieu Chillaud, Frank Tetart (2007): The Demilitarization of Kaliningrad: A 'Sisyphian Task'? *Baltic Security and Defence Review*, 2007:9, pp. 171-186.

28 ITAR-TASS (2014): Russia-Estonia border treaty to come into force despite Ukraine crisis. <http://itar-tass.com/en/world/750007>, last access: 9.12.2014.

29 Lauri Mälksoo (2001): Soviet Genocide? Communist Mass Deportations in the Baltic States and International Law. *Leiden Journal of International Law*, 14:4, p. 766.

30 Latvijas Statistika (2012): On key provisional results of Population and Housing Census 2011. <http://www.csb.gov.lv/en/notikumi/key-provisional-results-population-and-housing-census-2011-33306.html>, last access: 10.12.2014.

31 http://pub.stat.ee/px-web.2001/Dialog/varval.asp?ma=P00222&path=../_Databas/Population/01Population_indicators_and_composition/04Population_figure_and_composition/&lang=1, last access: 10.12.2014.

32 Holger Mölder (2011): The Cooperative Security Dilemma in the Baltic Sea Region. *Journal of Baltic Studies*, 42:2p. 161

33 Jakob Ljungman (2014): Rysslands informationskrig i Litauen. www.fri-varld.se/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/rapport_ljungman.pdf, last access 3.12.2014. See also: Agnia Grigas (2012): Legacies, Coercion and Soft Power – Russian Influence in the Baltic States. Chatham House Briefing Paper, Royal Institute of International Affairs.

34 Karsten Brüggemann, Andres Kasekamp (2008): The Politics of History and the „War of Monuments“ in Estonia. *Nationalities Papers – The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, 36:3, p. 440.

35 Cited in Steve Gutterman (2007): Russia Warns Against Rewriting History. www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/07/AR2007050700994.html, last access 10.12.2014.

36 Cf. Holger Mölder (2011): The Cooperative Security Dilemma in the Baltic Sea Region. *Journal of Baltic Studies*, 42:2, p.159.

37 Ole Wæver (1996): European Security Identities. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 34:1, p. 122.

38 Igor Zevelev (2014): The Russian World Boundaries – Russia's National Identity Transformation and New Foreign Policy Doctrine. <http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/The-Russian-World-Boundaries-16707>, last access: 10.12.2014.

39 Cf. Richard Herzinger (2014): Die Angst vor der neosowjetischen Bedrohung. 28.8.2014, www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article131662444/Die-Angst-vor-der-neosowjetischen-Bedrohung.html, last access: 9.12.2014.

40 Cf. Janice Großstein (2013): Threat Perceptions in International Politics. In: Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy (eds., 2013): *The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*. Oxford University Press.

41 Cf. Michael Linden, M. Rotter, K. Baumann, B. Lieberei (2007): *Posttraumatic Embitterment Disorder*. Hogrefe Verlag.

42 Michael Linden (2003): *Posttraumatic Embitterment Disorder*. *Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics*, Vol. 72, No. 4, 2003, pp. 195-202.

43 Stephen F. Larrabee (2010): Russia, Ukraine, and Central Europe – The Return of Geopolitics. *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 63, No. 2

44 Wladislaw Inosemzew (2014): Die Drohende Krise. *IP Länderporträt Russland*, 2014:2, p. 4.

45 Germany Trade & Invest (2014): *Wirtschaftsdaten kompakt – Russland*. www.gtai.de/GTAI/Content/DE/Trade/Fachdaten/PUB/2012/11/pub2012112680091111_159230.pdf, last access 10.12.2014.

46 Swedbank (2014): *Baltic Sea Report*. Swedbank Macro Research 2014, www.swedbank.lv/en/analitiskie_materiali/baltijas_juras_regiona_apskats/, last access: 10.12.2014.

47 Cf. Stefan Rausch (2014): Russlands Gas nach Europa. Nord Stream im Kontext einer Europäischen Energiesicherheitspolitik. Master thesis, University of Rostock. p. 4.

48 Lisa Hegemann (2014): Gazprom, der heimliche deutsche Riese. www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/industrie/russischer-grosskonzern-gazprom-der-heimliche-deutsche-riese/9636362.html, 19.3.2014, last access: 5.1.2015.

49 Dmitri Trenin (2009): Russia's Spheres of Interest, not influence. *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 32, Issue 4, pp. 3-22.

50 Thomas Graham (2010): The Sources of Russia's Insecurity. *Survival – Global Politics and Strategy*, 52:1, p. 62.

51 Cf. Bo Huldt (1999): Security in the Baltic Sea Region. Jahrbuch für internationale Sicherheitspolitik 1999, E.S. Mittler und Sohn, p. 150.

Über den Autoren:

Dipl.-Pol. Tim-Åke Pentz
Faculty of Interdisciplinary Research, Dept. Maritime Systems, University of Rostock
Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences, Inst. of Political and Administrative Sciences, University of Rostock

E-Mail: tim-ake.pentz@uni-rostock.de

»gesehen, gehört, gelesen«

Zwischen Landeskunde, Reiseführer und Kabarett

Christopher Dietrich, Unendliche Weiten – Mecklenburg-Vorpommern & Ostsee – Ein Heimatbuch, Conbook Medien GmbH, Meerbusch 2014, 255 Seiten.

Christopher Dietrich, Jahrgang 1979, setzt mit seinem Buch ein humorvolles Ausrufezeichen im Reigen der Reiseführer und Landeskunden zu Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. Der gebürtige Rostocker ist einem breiteren Kreis im Land und darüber hinaus bereits als Kabarettist bekannt, der in den frühen 2000ern für das Studentenkabarett „ROhrSTOCK“ auftrat und seit 2002 im prämierten Duo „DIETRICH & RAAB“ aktiv ist. Dietrich, der als studierter Germanist und Historiker jüngst zum Thema „Kontrollierte Freiräume. Das Kabarett in der DDR zwischen MfS und SED“ promovierte, gelingt mit seinem „Heimatbuch“ ein kurzweiliger und unterhaltsamer Beitrag. Das Buch ist in der gleichnamigen Reihe der Conbook Medien GmbH erschienen, die bereits 15 weitere Nummern veröffentlicht hat. Neben Metropolen wie Berlin, Hamburg oder München wurden auch einzelne Regionen wie Westfalen, Franken oder die Eifel betrachtet.

Getragen durch die fiktive Rahmenhandlung einer 24-tägigen Reise durch das Land im Auftrag des Wirtschaftsministeriums zur Suche eines neuen Werbeslogans für das Landesmarketing, beschreibt Dietrich unterschiedliche Stationen von Boltenhagen bis Rügen, vom Fischland Darß bis nach Ludwigslust. Eine Weiterentwicklung des bekannten Mottos „MV tut gut“ sei angebracht – so der Auftrag des Autors –, da außerhalb des Landes viele Menschen mit MV den ehemaligen DFB-Präsidenten Dr. Mayer-Vorfelder in Verbindung brächten (S. 24) und weniger das nordöstliche Bundesland.

Die beschriebene Reise ist als „Heimatbuch“ in dreifacher Hinsicht lesenswert. Erstens ist sie eine informative Landeskunde und Reiseführer zugleich. Geschickt gelingt dem Autor das Verweben von Heimatkunde, der Geschichte von Land, Menschen, Orten und Besonderheiten, Themen von Politik und Wirtschaft mit zahllosen Details und Anekdoten. Ein Orts- und Personenregister sowie kleine Übersichten (Wörterbuch, wichtige Personen und Veranstaltungen) unterstreichen den Informationsgehalt als Reiseführer durch Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. Zweitens ist der kabarettistische Stil an sich lesenswert. Humorvoll und amüsant blickt Dietrich auf Eigenheiten und Entwicklungen seines Bundeslandes. Pointierte Ortsbeschreibungen (z.B. zu Wismar: „Die Altstadt ist so liebevoll, dass man eine gigantisch graue Werfthalle daneben gebaut hat, um die Schönheit überhaupt aushalten zu können.“ (S. 42/43)), der Einsatz des „Demokratie-Buses“ der Landeszentrale für politische Bildung (S. 216) und die Beschreibung unterschiedlicher Internetgeschwindigkeiten (S. 40) seien hier exemplarisch genannt. Drittens ist die Perspektive des Autors auf sein Heimatbundesland eine Bereicherung und Anregung zugleich. „Mecklenburg-Vorpommern – immer noch besser als Schleswig-Holstein!“ (S. 247), auch wenn dies vielleicht nicht der nächste Slogan das Landesmarketing werden wird, zeigt der Autor, dass den verschiedenen Problemen und Herausforderungen auch immer eine Zuversicht und Chance innewohnt, die auf vielschichtige Art und Weise von den Menschen vor Ort in Angriff genommen wird. Wenn der kabarettistische Stil auch nicht überall Befürworter finden mag, stellt der Blick auf Mecklenburg-Vorpommern durch die Feder von Christopher Dietrich doch eine gelungene Kombination von unterhaltender Landeskunde und informativem Reiseführer dar. Dies gilt für Gäste und Einheimische des Bundeslandes gleichermaßen. (mk)



Mecklenburg-Vorpommern „Weiße Strände – weite Felder – wenig Handyempfang. Ein Land der Ruhe und Entspannung.“

News & Termine

Neuerscheinung: „Models of Democracy in Nordic and Baltic Europe“


Nicholas Aylott (Eds.), *Models of Democracy in Nordic and Baltic Europe. Political Institutions and Discourse*, 284 S., Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited 2014.

This book explores the ways in which representative democracy works in two neighbouring collections of European states: the Nordic (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) and the Baltic (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). Starting from a Nordic vantage point, contributors explore the extent to which aspects of politics function similarly or dissimilarly across the two groups of democratic states, acknowledging the differences in models of democracy that occur within each group. Authors explore the possibility that some of the apparently successful institutional features of Nordic politics have somehow influenced politics in the Baltic states, despite the considerable contextual differences between the two groups. The Nordic-Baltic comparison is particularly worthy of study, given the comparative stability of the Nordic democracies and the half century of occupation by a totalitarian dictatorship that the Baltic states endured. For more information visit: <http://www.ashgate.com/isbn/9781472409409>

Neuerscheinung: „Beyond the Sea“

Marta Grzechnik und Heta Hurskainen (Eds.), *Beyond the Sea. Reviewing the manifold dimensions of water as barrier and bridge*, 269 S., Köln: Böhlau Verlag 2015.

The dominant narratives about the seas and maritime regions in European societies have usually placed them at the periphery, distant from the social and political centres, and often perceived as empty spaces akin to deserts: they could be crossed but not used. Therefore, most categories to examine societies have been designed from a land-oriented perspective and with the focus on land-based societies. Changing this perspective and putting the sea – the periphery – in the centre challenges traditional narratives, leading to new, enriching interpretations. Following this path, this volume re-envisioning water beyond its immanent physical character – as a space ascribed with various roles and functions, both bridging and dividing: a borderland of communication, a space to govern and to invest with symbolic meaning. For more information visit: www.boehlau-verlag.com/978-3-412-22293-2.html



Fehlt noch was?

Haben Sie Termine und Ankündigungen mit Bezug zum Ostseeraum? Senden Sie einfach die entsprechenden Informationen an: agos@uni-rostock.de

Who is who in der Ostseeregion

Paweł Żaboklicki, Generalsekretär der Union der Ostseestädte (Union of Baltic Cities, UBC)



(© Paweł Żaboklicki)

„Die Ostsee vereint und trennt nicht.“

In der Ostseeregion ist Paweł Żaboklicki ein ausgewiesener Experte für Städtekooperationen. Als Generalsekretär der Union der Ostseestädte (Union of the Baltic Cities, UBC) koordiniert er die Arbeit und die Aktivitäten des Generalsekretariats der Städteunion, die 100 Städte aus zehn Ländern der Region zusammenführt und ihren Sitz in Gdańsk hat. Die Mitgliedsstädte nutzen die UBC zum Erfahrungsaustausch über die Entwicklung und die Gestaltung des Lebens in Städten. Die Liste der Themen ist beeindruckend lang. Darunter: Umweltschutz, Mobilität in Städten, effektive Stadtverwaltung, Jugendförderung, Zivilschutz, Wirtschaftsförderung, medizinische und soziale Versorgung, Sportförderung, Integration und Gleichberechtigung.

Was das Besondere an den Ostseestädten ist, da ist sich der gebürtige Gdańsker sicher: „Ich habe das Gefühl, dass viele Ostseestädte die Kooperation innerhalb der Region eher als Priorität empfinden, als die Kooperation mit der eigenen Hauptstadt oder anderen Europäischen Regionen. Die gemeinsame Geschichte und gemeinsamen kulturellen Wurzeln vereinfachen die Zusammenarbeit und die Integration. Die Ostsee vereint und trennt nicht – da unterscheiden wir uns zum Beispiel vom Mittelmeer“.

Vor seiner Arbeit als Generalsekretär hat der Umweltingenieur, der an der TU Gdańsk studiert hat, für eine Reihe schwedischer Firmen gearbeitet - darunter Uppsala Energi AB, Perstorp AB das Göteborgs VA-Verket oder GRYAAB. Zur UBC kam Paweł Żaboklicki dann zunächst als Assistent seines Amtsvorgängers.

Mit Blick auf die Ostseekooperation ist er überzeugt, dass die Europäische Strategie für den Ostseeraum eine wichtige und gute Idee ist, um Themen und Ressourcen für eine bessere Zusammenarbeit in der Region zu bündeln. Hinsichtlich des Subsidiaritätsprinzips bestünde hingegen weiterer Handlungsbedarf. „Wir sollten darauf hinarbeiten, noch mehr Verantwortungskompetenzen von dem Zentralstaat auf die regionale und lokale Ebene zu verschieben.“

Die Begeisterung und den Einsatz für die Sache scheint bei Żaboklickis in der Familie zu liegen: Es heißt, dass ein Vorfahre, Priester Wincenty Żaboklicki, im 19. Jahrhundert während der Teilung Polens zwischen Russland, Preußen und Österreich als polnischer Freiheitskämpfer gefangen und von Kaiser Franz I. zunächst zum Tode und dann zur Kerkerhaft verurteilt wurde. Sein Leben, so wird vermutet, war die Vorlage für Adam Mickiewicz Charakter des Priesters Robak im „Pan Tadeus“, dem polnischen Nationalepos.

Ganz so dramatisch geht es im Leben von Paweł Żaboklicki zum Glück nicht zu. Dennoch wird schnell deutlich, wie sehr ihm die Zusammenarbeit mit Kollegen und Partnern aller Ostseeanrainer am Herzen liegt. Umso mehr freut sich Paweł Żaboklicki auf die 13. Generalkonferenz der UBC in Gdynia vom 27.-30.10.2015 hinzuweisen: „Jeder, der sich für Städtekooperationen im Ostseeraum interessiert, ist herzlich eingeladen.“

Natürlich gibt es auch ein Leben außerhalb der UBC. Wo trifft man den verheirateten Familienvater, wenn nicht gerade Vorstandssitzung vorbereitet, Finanzen überprüft werden oder Fachberichte ausgearbeitet werden müssen? „In meiner Freizeit bin ich natürlich am liebsten bei meiner Familie.“ Die Chancen, Paweł Żaboklicki auf einem Tennisplatz oder beim Volleyball anzutreffen, stehen aber auch nicht schlecht. (tap)

Impressum

Universität Rostock, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät,
Institut für Politik- und Verwaltungswissenschaften, Lehrstuhl für Vergleichende Regierungslehre/AGOS
Anschrift: Ulmenstraße 69, 18057 Rostock

Redaktion und ständige Mitglieder AGOS:

Prof. Dr. Nikolaus Werz [Leiter] (nw)
Martin Koschkar, M. A. (mk)
Christian Nestler, M. A. (cn)
Dipl.-Pol. Tim-Åke Pentz (tap)

Telefon: 0381/498-4444, Fax: 0381/498-4445, Email: agos@uni-rostock.de

Bildnachweis: Titelbild © Christian Nestler

ISSN 2198-9567